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Abstract
The intensified international migration pressures of the recent decades prompted many developed
countries to revise their immigration regulations and increase border controls. However, the devel-
opment of these reforms as well as their effectiveness in actually managing new immigration flows
remains poorly understood. The main reason is that migration regulations are hard to quantify,
which has prevented the construction of a universal measure of migration policy. To fill this gap
in the literature, we construct an indicator of the restrictiveness of immigration entry policy across
countries as well as a more comprehensive indicator of migration policy that also accounts for staying
requirements and regulations to foster integration. These indexes are then used to disentangle the
factors determining the toughness of migration regulations. Our empirical framework combines ele-
ments from the median voter and interest group approach and accounts for cross-country correlation
in migration policies. We find strong evidence of spatial correlation in particular in entry restrictive-
ness, while the impact of economic determinants of migration policy remains much more modest.
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1 Introduction
In his review of research on the economics of international migration, Hatton (2014, p.47) notes that
‘One of the biggest challenges has been to somehow characterise subtle and complex migration policies in
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the form of index numbers, something that recent studies have attempted to do.’ A synthetic indicator
by which migration policy can be measured and which is comparable between countries in terms of their
openness to immigration does not exist. As a result, ‘[p]olicy formation is central to the immigration
debate, yet until recently, it has largely been the domain of political science rather than economics’ (Hatton,
2014, p.46). Moreover, little is known about how a country’s migration policies are set and to what extent
they have actually managed to shape recent worldwide migration patterns.
For the most part, this gap in the literature is due to the lack of comprehensive and comparable
data on immigration policies. As pointed out by Czaika and De Haas (2013) the qualitative nature of
migration policies has hindered the development of a systematic method for measuring and classifying
migration policies across countries and over time. The reason is that most countries do not set their
migration policy in a uniform way by means of overall quotas, but allow for different entry tracks based
on multiple criteria.
Only a limited number of data collection initiatives construct migration policy indexes that can effec-
tively be compared across countries and time. Despite the range of available migration policy indicators,
none of them offers a measure of a country’s overall openness towards international migration. Most
available indicators tend to focus on specific aspects of migration policy such as citizenship policies,
integration policies or non-discrimination policies alone, thereby ignoring potential interaction or com-
pensation effects. In addition, their country and time coverage can be quite limited and the weighting
schemes to construct composite indexes from the data are often arbitrary, or lack transparency. In fact,
in their overview of indicators of migration policy, Bjerre et al. (2015) note that of the three stages of
index building (i.e. conceptualisation, measurement and aggregation), all efforts to quantify policy so
far have been limited to the first two stages. Methodological questions regarding aggregation, such as
how to combine quantitative and qualitative information, which weighting scheme to choose and how to
deal with missing values, measurement errors and heterogeneous data quality have received much less
attention.
This paper proposes to aggregate the existing information on the restrictiveness of migration policy
using a Bayesian state-space model, a statistically-determined weighting scheme. The novelty of this
technique is that it is able to account for measurement errors in the underlying indicators. As such, we
can use the information in indicators of varying quality and correct for the (in)accuracy of the estimated
migration policy indexes in any subsequent computations or regressions. In addition, by making use of the
time-dependence in the underlying indicators, the state-space model circumvents the problem of missing
observations. As a result, it provides more stable and reliable estimates while significantly increasing data
availability and coverage without imputations or other ad-hoc manipulations. We use this methodology to
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combine all publicly available data sources that are informative on migration policies into an index of entry
restrictiveness as well as a more comprehensive indicator of migration policy restrictiveness (available
upon request). The latter also accounts for regulations concerning stay requirements and integration
(e.g. the rules regarding family reunion), as those influence the ease of residence of an immigrant in a
host country and can be seen as indirect entry restrictions.
After constructing these synthetic indexes of migration policy, we proceed to identify and disentangle
the determinants of legal barriers to immigration in OECD countries. The literature on the determinants
of immigration policy is scarce and applies either a median voter approach (Hix and Noury, 2007; Milner
and Tingley, 2011; Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011) or an interest group approach (Facchini and Mayda,
2008). These studies bypassed the construction of an indicator of immigration policy by restricting the
focus to the voting behaviour of legislators on immigration law projects or proposals (e.g. in the US house
of representatives), or the attributed number of visa. The new indicators that we construct, in contrast,
allow for a cross-country panel analysis of economic and political determinants corresponding to both
median voter and interest group approaches. Moreover, it allows us to consider the spatial correlation
in migration policies. Countries take the behaviour of neighbouring governments into account when
managing their own immigration flows, as was shown by Timmer and Williams (1998) for the late 19th
and early 20th century and Boeri and Bru¨cker (2005) for the EU15 countries after the enlargement to
Central and Eastern Europe.
In the next section, we briefly describe the existing migration policy indicators which we will use to
construct our migration policy indexes, as well as the construction of our indexes of migration policy
using the state-space model. In the third section, we discuss our findings regarding the determinants
of migration policy from a cross-country analysis. The final section concludes and discusses topics for
further research.
2 The measurement of migration policy
2.1 Overview and selection of individual migration policy databases
For the selection of individual measures of immigration policies, we rely on five criteria as suggested by
De Lombaerde et al. (2008): availability, relevance, comparability, timeliness and accuracy. Specifically,
we select all law-based measures that are publicly available (both levels and changes) dealing with eco-
nomic migration in recent decades (excluding regulations that apply strictly to asylum policy).1 We do
1These could be included in a future extension of the migration policy index. As asylum is driven in the first place by
specific motives (human rights) and is internationally regulated by the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951, we preferred
to leave out asylum rules at this stage.
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not consider outcome-based measures of immigration policy because these conflate the results of a coun-
try’s immigration laws (such as the scarcity of visas or immigration quota) with its intended objectives
(Clark et al., 2007; Hatton, 2004; Berthe´lemy et al., 2009; Hatton and Williamson, 2009). Moreover,
outcome-based measures are ‘a mix of policy and incentive’ (Hatton, 2014) and therefore do not just
reflect the policy dimension.2 This section briefly elaborates on the measures that comply with the
selection criteria. More detailed information on each of these sources can be found in appendix A.
Several studies provide a measure of policy stance by identifying major changes in different policy
dimensions which allows to keep track of the evolution in migration policies over time. These are typically
combined into an indicator of the timing and direction of policy changes, where a shift in the index value
reflects a significant increase or decrease in the tightness of a particular dimension of immigration law.
In particular, Ortega and Peri (2009) and Mayda (2010) create dummies tracking the change in OECD
policies that target economic migrants (OP).3 More broadly, the UN’s International Immigration Policies
Database (IIPD) provides accurate and objective information on the existence of certain policies on
immigration and emigration. None of these dummies, however, provide information on the initial level
of restrictiveness nor on the relative magnitude of the change; i.e. no distinction can be made between
gradual policy adaptation versus big bang reforms (Czaika and De Haas, 2013).
One exception is the DEMIG POLICY database compiled as part of the Determinants of International
Migration (DEMIG) project (see de Haas et al., 2015). It describes the direction and magnitude of 6500
changes in immigration and emigration policies in 45 countries, forming the largest change-tracking
database completed to date. Unlike previously constructed databases, it disaggregates major policy
changes into their individual policy measures and specifies which migrant group was targeted by each
policy measure. However, its unit of analysis is a policy change occurring in a specific country and year
rather than the country-year pair itself and the database was not constructed for the purpose of cross-
country comparisons (de Haas et al., 2015). As a result, we cannot use the DEMIG POLICY database
in the construction of our measures of immigration policies. Nevertheless, the disaggregation provides
information on migration policy changes towards specific migrant groups (e.g. high versus low skilled
workers). As such, DEMIG POLICY provides an indication of changes in selectivity of migration policies,
which will prove particularly useful in Section 2.5.
Only a handful of data collection initiatives construct indicators of migration policy that can effectively
2The effectiveness of migration policies cannot be tested using outcome-based measures without accounting for potential
endogeneity stemming from the fact that these measures are influenced by the same factors as the immigrant flow itself
(Czaika and De Haas, 2013).
3Hatton (2004) and Hatton (009b), on the other hand, develop an index capturing changes in the toughness of asylum
policies, which we exclude for reasons outlined above.
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be compared across countries. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) developed by Niessen et al.
(2007) identifies integration regulations for immigrants in 38 Western countries between the years 2007
and 2014. In addition, the migration component of the Commitment to Development Index (CDI),
designed by Grieco and Hamilton (2004) and published annually by the Center for Global Development,
ranks 27 of the world’s richest countries on their dedication to policies that aid poor countries by opening
their borders to migrants.4 The Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCPI) developed by Queen’s University
provides a measure of the extent to which 21 Western democracies are accommodating and supportive of
ethnocultural minorities at three points in time: 1980, 2000 and 2010. As such, it can be informative about
the well-being of immigrants and the openness of the countries to immigration. Finally, the Inventory
of Migration Policies (IMP) constructed by the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti analyses changes in the
openness of immigration policy targeting economic migrants in twelve EU15 countries over the period
1990-2005 (Jacobs, 2011).5
Data availability is expected to substantially improve further in the future by a number of ongoing
projects such as the International Migration Policy And Law Analysis (IMPALA). The latter attempts
to measure immigration policies in a fundamentally different way, distinguishing between different ‘entry
tracks’ (which can be considered the most elementary level in immigration policy) and registering relevant
laws and regulations for each of them (Beine et al., 2015). In terms of transparency and comprehensive-
ness, i.e. quality of the data, this will constitute a major step forward. However, as Beine et al. (2015)
note, projects like IMPALA will probably not resolve all the outstanding issues in the construction of
a composite index of (the restrictiveness of) a country’s immigration policy. When new datasets like
IMPALA become available, they can be fairly easily integrated in future versions of the migration policy
indexes.
2.2 Constructing the Migration Policy Indexes
All together, these sources provide us with a database of over 250 indicators of migration policy (the full
list can be found in appendix B). These were classified into the three categories traditionally distinguished
in migration policy: (1) entry policies (including family reunification); (2) stay policies (permanent as
4For an application using this indicator to investigate the impact of aid on migration, see Berthe´lemy et al. (2009).
5Other comparable indicators which we do not consider (respectively because they fall out of our time range or because
they are not publicly available are those constructed by Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) and Thielemann (2004). The former
created the migration institutional index for 14 OECD countries for the period 1870-1919, combining citizenship laws, land
distribution policy, public education policy, and attitudes toward immigration, all of which enter the index with equal
weight. Thielemann (2004), on the other hand, constructed an asylum deterrence index for 20 OECD countries between
1985-1999 based on the OECD’s Trends in International Migration and the US Committee for Refugees’ World Refugee
Survey. The index aggregates a number of dummy variables to obtain a yearly indicator of asylum deterrence at the country
level, but it has not been made publicly available.
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opposed to temporary migration); and (3) integration policies (including migrant rights). The main focus
of the literature trying to explain the development and consequences of migration regulations has been
on admission procedures, i.e. the first category. Nonetheless, using this database we can construct three
different migration policy indexes MPIE , MPIS and MPII , respectively of entry, stay and integra-
tion policies, that asses the restrictiveness of each of these sub-fields of migration policy, as well as a
comprehensive indicator MPIC reflecting the overall stance of migration policy.
However, combining the different indicators of migration policy is less straightforward than it seems.
The biggest problem when aggregating the information are the differences in availability of the various
databases, as figure 1 illustrates. The black line shows the number of available data points in each year
as a percentage of the total number if all indicators were available for each country. Data availability
between 1996 and 2006 is never more than 3%, it jumps to 10% in 2007 and continues to increase slowly
to 15% in 2014. The sharp increase is caused by the availability of MIPEX data in the second half of the
2000s. While less severe, the problem persists when the sample is limited to the 38 countries for which
we have information on both the level and the change in the restrictiveness of migration policy (the blue
dashed line).6 Any index that ignores this availability problem will be distorted, making it impossible to
distinguish actual changes in migration policy from changes in the availability of the underlying data.
Figure 1: Data availability for the entire world (black line) and the estimation subset (blue dashed line)
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Note: Percentage of the countries covered in each year, averaged over all indicators.
A factor that further complicates the aggregation of these indicators is that their characteristics
can be quite different: some variables are continuous while other are dichotomous and a number of
indicators capture only changes over time but cannot be compared over a cross section of countries
(i.e. OP and IIPD). If all indicators were measured on an interval scale, without missing values, and if
a quantitative indicator of their importance were available (like the number or share of total migrants
affected), the indexes could be created using a classical index number technique (Paasche, Laspeyre
or Divisia). However, the difficulty is precisely that the available information does not satisfy these
conditions: the indicators are frequently measured on an ordinal or binary scale; missing values are
6This sample corresponds to the members of the EU and OECD, excluding Chile, Mexico, Israel.
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pervasive; and a straightforward option for the choice of the weights is lacking.
In order to take these problems into account while making as few additional assumptions as possible,
we use a state-space model to compose the migration policy indexes MPIE , MPIS and MPII . The
specification of the state-space model can be adjusted to the data, allowing us to combine continuous
and binary indicators, as well as indicators whose level cannot initially be compared across countries.
It also has an intuitive and easy solution for missing data that relies on the fact that the state-space
model uses the temporal dimension of the data to increase the reliability of the estimates. The weights
of the individual indicators and the temporal dimension is chosen such that it matches whatever pattern
is present in the underlying indicators. Moreover, the estimation will return the entire distribution of
the policy indexes at each point in time. This enables us to correctly take the underlying uncertainty
into account when comparing the indexes over time or over countries and when using them in further
regressions.
2.2.1 The state-space model
This section outlines the state-space model that is used to construct the migration policy indexes, fo-
cussing on the entry policy index MPIE . The stay and integration subindexes MPIS and MPII are
then computed in the same way. The comprehensive index of migration policy is subsequently computed
as the simple average of these three indexes, i.e. MPIC = 13
(
MPIE +MPIS +MPII
)
, in order to
guarantee that the entry, stay and integration policy components are equally weighted.7
The standard state-space model is defined by a measurement equation (1) and a state equation
(5). The measurement equation captures the idea that each indicator of entry policy yκ is related to an
unknown level of openness of entry policy MPIE . However, in doing so, they make a certain measurement
error (κ), whose variance (Hκ) can differ across indicators. Similarly, the scaling parameters cκ and zκ
are allowed to vary across indicators.8 The measurement equation can be written as:
yκi,t = c
κ + zκ ∗MPIEi,t + i,t. (1)
where κi,t ∼ N(0, Hκ) and subscripts i and t refer to the country and year, respectively.
By changing the measurement equation of some of the variables, we can adjust the model to deal
with indicators whose level cannot be compared across countries. For these indicators, the constant cκi
is allowed to differ across countries, thereby capturing the fact that the initial policy level was unknown.
7When MPIC is constructed based on the state-space model using all indicators, the comprehensive index ends up being
very similar to the component with the highest data availability, i.e. the integration policy index.
8Cross-correlation between the error terms of different indicators is ruled out: E(k1′k2 ) = 0.
7
In this case the measurement equation becomes:
yκi,t = c
κ
i + z
κ ∗MPIEi,t + i,t. (2)
We can also modify the measurement equation to deal with the dichotomous nature of some variables.
To this end, we augment the model using a continuous latent variable y? in the style of a logit or probit
model which gives:
y?i,t = c
κ + zκ ∗MPIEi,t + i,t (3)
yκi,t =
 0 if y?i,t ≤ 01 otherwise. (4)
The state equation, on the other hand, captures the fact that migration policy by definition has a
unit root: unless some government action is taken to change it, policy today is the same as that of
yesterday.9 To that end, this equation consists of two components: the lagged migration policy index
and a term capturing the yearly change in policy, µi,t. The latter is assumed to be normally distributed
with mean zero and its standard deviation is set to one to ensure that the model is identified. The
underlying assumption is that the current restrictiveness or openness of migration policy does not tell us
how it will change over time. Rather, the only indication of change in migration policy will come from
the measurement equation and the indicators collected in yκi,t.
MPIEi,t = MPI
E
i,t−1 + µi,t. (5)
The state equation is used to predict the current level of openness, using the future and past level of
openness. This prediction is then updated using the indicators collected, as described in the measurement
equation. The more reliable an indicator is (the smaller Hκ), the stronger the effect of this updating step
on the final estimate.
Before the model can be run, missing observations are replaced by random and meaningless noise:
if yκi,t is missing, it is set to zero while the variance of its error term H
κ
i,t is set to infinity. As a result,
the state-space model will ignore the information in these observations since they come from a source
whose measurement error is infinitely large. Nevertheless, the information is no longer missing allowing
the model to be run. Given that MPIE depends on its previous values, the information in preceding and
future observations will be used to impute the level of entry policy at time t. This will be done within
the model, removing the need to impute or manipulate the data ex ante in some other way.
In contrast to the correlation over time, the model does not take the potential spatial correlation
of migration policy into account. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this does not rule out that
9We also estimated a version of the model where the level of time dependence was allowed to vary for each country
(MPIEi,t = Ti ∗MPIEi,t + µi,t) but this did not significantly alter the resulting index values.
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the index will show evidence of spatial correlation. Because the values of the indexes are drawn for one
country at a time, cross-sectional independence is never imposed on the data. If the underlying indicators
show evidence of spatial correlation this will be reflected in the indexes. This information is simply not
used in the estimations, as this would require us to impose a specific spatial correlation structure on the
data.
2.2.2 Estimation using a Bayesian Gibbs sampler
The state-space models of the migration policy indexes were estimated on the sample of 38 countries that
include (at least one) indicator that tracks the level of restrictiveness, leaving aside the 157 countries
that only cover the change in migration policy. Restricting the estimation sample in this way allows
us to better compare the characteristics of the different indicators of migration policy (i.e. the scaling
parameters cκ, cκi , z and variance H
κ). As shown in Figure 1, focussing on this sample significantly
decreases the fraction of missing observations. Nonetheless, once these parameters are estimated using
this subsample, the indexes can be computed for the entire world. Note however that for the 157 countries
where data on the level of restrictiveness is missing, the indexes can only be used for comparisons over
time.
The state-space model is estimated using a Bayesian Gibbs sampler, i.e. a Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) estimator. This technique is built on the separation of complex (posterior) probabilities
into much easier to solve conditional probabilities. If the values of the MPIE index were known, the
parameters of the state and measurement equations could be estimated using simple linear regressions and
we could easily compute the distribution of their parameters. Similarly, if these parameters were known,
we could compute and draw from the distribution of MPIE using a simulation smoother. Iteratively
drawing from these conditional distributions (while conditioning on the last drawn value), will produce
draws that converge to the original unconditional distribution (Kim and Nelson, 1999).
To estimate each indicator, the Gibbs sampler is run for 100,000 iterations, of which the first 50,000
are discarded as burn-in.10 The remaining iterations are used to compute the expected value, standard
deviation and other characteristics of the migration policy indexes. The comprehensive MPIC and its
characteristics are then constructed by first normalising the indexes MPIE , MPIS and MPII such that
their expected value and standard deviation over all countries and years is zero and one, respectively.
Rather than taking the average of the expected values of the indexes, MPIC is computed as the average
10The burn-in are the first iterations of the Gibbs sampler that are discarded to ensure that the starting value of the
iterative estimation process no longer influences the results. As this is a Bayesian estimator, we also have to be explicit about
the prior assumptions, but since ex-ante information on the distribution of the parameters is lacking, we use uninformative
(flat) priors.
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over the different iterations of each index. As a result, its standard deviation, confidence intervals and
other characteristics still fully reflect the (un)certainty of the different migration policy indexes of which
it is composed.
Defining MPI
E(l)
i,t , MPI
S(l)
i,t and MPI
S(l)
i,t as the normalised l
th iterations of the entry, stay and
integration policy indexes, we can write the lth iteration of the comprehensive migration policy index as
MPI
C(l)
i,t =
1
3
(
MPI
E(l)
i,t +MPI
S(l)
i,t +MPI
S(l)
i,t
)
. (6)
As was the case for the subcomponents, these different iterations allow us to compute the (expected value
of) MPIC , its standard deviation and confidence interval. Moreover, the separate iterations can also be
used in multiple imputation or Gibbs sampling analyses to ensure that any subsequent regressions take
the (un)certainty of the migration policy indexes into account.
2.3 The Migration Policy Indexes
The results of the estimation procedure are the three indexes MPIE , MPIS and MPII measuring the
restrictiveness of entry, stay and integration policies as well as the comprehensive indicator MPIC which
combines information on all three dimensions. All four indicators can be interpreted in the same way: an
increase in the index value corresponds to an increase in the openness towards migration. These index
values can be compared over time without any restrictions. However, in cross-sectional comparisons the
indexes of only 38 countries can be used, as the others lack information on the (initial) level of openness.
The four indexes hide a great variability in the underlying indicators. Figure 2 illustrates this by
plotting the correlation between the MPI indexes with the indicators used to create the respective index.
This correlation coefficient is small for most indicators and sometimes even negative. The uncertainty
is in turn reflected in the confidence bounds of the migration policy indexes which are relatively large.
For instance, the (normalised) immigration entry index of the countries that can be compared cross-
sectionally ranges from −6.4 to 1.1 with an average width of the confidence intervals of 1.5. As the mean
of MPIE was set to zero, its distribution is clearly skewed to the left. In contrast, the comprehensive
migration index has a much more symmetrical distribution that ranges from −4.7 to 4.9. This results
from the observation that the lowest entry scores are compensated by higher values on the stay and
especially the integration indexes. Overall, we find that the correlation of the stay with the entry index
is only 0.18, while the correlation with the integration index is negative (−0.17).
Even when the uncertainty of the indexes is taken into consideration, the indexes are informative about
the countries’ migration policy. By way of illustration, figure 3 plots over time the values of MPIE and
MPIC for the US, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, together with their 95% confidence intervals.
10
For Germany and the Netherlands, we notice a significant increase in the restrictiveness of immigration
entry policy since 1996, in contrast with Sweden and the US. The more comprehensive index of migration
policy (MPIC) on the other hand remains relatively constant over time, with the exception of the
significant increase in openness in the case of Sweden. While initially the level of restrictiveness was more
or less the same for these four countries, the different trends in their policy and shrinking confidence
intervals result in significant differences for both indexes of migration policy in 2014. The contrast
between the evolution of MPIE and MPIC for Germany and the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent
Sweden) provides further evidence for the evolution towards a more restrictive entry policy which is
compensated by improved integration rights over the past two decades.
Figure 2: Correlation of MPIE , MPIS , MPII and MPIC with individual indicators
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Note: Correlation of the MPI indexes with the individual indicators used to create them.
A more general characterisation of the trends in migration policy requires that the uncertainty of the
estimates is dealt with in a more systematic way. As mentioned in the previous section, the different
draws from the Gibbs sampler estimation procedure can be used to identify the significance of differences
in the index values across countries and over time. Specifically, if in more than 95% of the draws, the
MPI value of country A is larger than that of country B, we can state that country A is significantly
more open with respect to that policy dimension than country B at the 5% significant level.
These significant differences allow us to construct a ranking of the countries in each year using two
simple rules. Firstly, a country will have rank x+1 if it is significantly more open than at least one country
11
Figure 3: MPIE (blue lines) and MPIC (black lines) and their 95% confidence bounds
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with rank x. Secondly, if a country’s policy is not significantly different from that of any other country, it
cannot be ranked. The advantage of constructing a ranking in this way is that small differences between
countries will not lead to a different ranking unless they can be identified as statistically significant
(Standaert, 2015). Figure 4 shows the results for the 38 countries whose level can be compared. Panels a
and b plot the openness of MPIE and MPIC values in 2014. When uncertainty is taken into account, the
entry (comprehensive) policy index is reduced to 5 (9) groups of countries whose level of restrictiveness
is not significantly different from one another (panels c and d). In terms of both indexes, Europe is
significantly more restrictive compared to North America or Australia, though the difference is much
less pronounced in terms of the comprehensive migration policy index than the immigration entry policy
index. In general, the different indexes lead to different country rankings, which is in line with the earlier
observation from figure 3 hinting at a trade-off between entry immigration policy and integration policy
and staying conditions.
In contrast to the differences between countries, changes over time can be computed for all countries
in the dataset. Panels a and b of figure 5 show the change in the MPIE and MPIC values between
1996 and 2014. Panels c and d depict how many of these are significant at the 10% level. Comparing
significant changes and changes overall show the importance of taking the uncertainty of the estimations
into account. Regarding immigration entry policy, we observe a significant increase of restrictiveness in
most (Western) European countries. Given the period under consideration, i.e. that of EU enlargement
to Central and Eastern Europe, it seems that a substantial number of old member states combined
increased mobility within Europe with a more restrictive policy with respect to third countries. Though
still present, the increase in restrictiveness is less outspoken for the comprehensive migration policy index
12
Figure 4: Entry and composite policy indexes in 2014: from open (dark green) to restrictive (light green)
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(c) MPIE significant rankings in 2014
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(d) MPIC significant rankings in 2014
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Notes: Plot of the values of MPIE (a), MPIC (b) and their significant rankings (c and d) in 2014. Two countries have
a different brightness in panels c and d when their level of entry or overall migration policy is significantly different at the
5% level.
(for which Sweden and Finland show the highest increase in liberalisation). Migration policy outside
Europe seems to have remained more or less unchanged in terms of restrictiveness between 1996 and
2014. The only exception is the US where the comprehensive migration policy (but not immigration
entry policy) has become slightly but significantly more liberal.
2.4 Spatial dependence
In line with earlier findings, the geographical grouping of shades in figures 4 and 5 suggests that neigh-
bouring countries converge in the level of migration policy restrictiveness and point to cross-country
correlation in migration policy determination. Migration regulations in one country seem to depend not
only on local determinants, but also on the restrictiveness of migration policies in alternative destinations.
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Figure 5: Changes in MPIE and MPIC between 1996-2014: from more open (blue) to more restrictive (red)
(a) Change in MPIE between 1996 and 2014
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(d) Significant changes in MPIC between 1996 and 2014
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Notes: Plot of the changes in MPIE (a), MPIC (b) and of the significant changes at the 10% level (c and d). Red (blue)
indicates that migration policy became more restrictive (open), with the brightness indicating the size of the change.
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Furthermore, spatial correlation might also stem from the increased harmonisation of migration policies,
like that following the creation of the Schengen Area within the European Union.
To test for the presence of spatial dependence in our constructed indicators of migration policy MPIE
and MPIC , we run a series of Moran’s I tests. Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics of these Moran’s
I tests using either a row-normalised contiguity or inverse-distance spatial weight matrix, respectively.
Specifically, we run separate Moran’s I tests for each year of the converged MPI draws of the Gibbs
sampler and report yearly averages and standard deviations of the Moran’s I statistic in the second and
third columns, as well as the percentage of those yearly draws for which the Moran’s I null hypothesis
of no spatial correlation can be rejected at the 10%, 5% or 1% significance level.
Table 1: Moran’s I test using row-standardised contiguity weight matrix - Descriptive statistics
MPIE MPIC
Percentage of draws with Percentage of draws with
Year Mean Std p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 Mean Std p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01
1996 0.191 0.155 51.88 36.28 14.48 0.256 0.136 71.00 53.12 22.00
1997 0.209 0.150 55.88 40.76 16.20 0.272 0.129 75.12 58.24 25.00
1998 0.226 0.142 61.36 44.36 17.24 0.287 0.123 80.00 63.52 28.00
1999 0.244 0.136 67.48 50.80 19.84 0.300 0.117 83.88 68.20 32.52
2000 0.262 0.131 72.88 55.76 23.08 0.311 0.112 86.32 73.24 34.92
2001 0.278 0.124 77.24 60.56 25.16 0.324 0.107 89.16 77.60 37.88
2002 0.292 0.117 81.72 65.44 28.16 0.334 0.101 92.72 81.16 41.60
2003 0.304 0.110 85.40 70.44 31.08 0.344 0.095 95.36 85.24 44.48
2004 0.316 0.102 90.24 75.12 33.04 0.353 0.088 96.84 89.16 48.16
2005 0.329 0.093 94.08 80.16 37.80 0.364 0.080 98.60 91.88 54.20
2006 0.344 0.082 97.16 87.92 42.00 0.372 0.073 99.44 95.28 58.36
2007 0.361 0.072 99.12 94.04 49.40 0.381 0.065 99.76 97.84 65.52
2008 0.389 0.064 99.88 98.08 67.52 0.425 0.057 100.00 99.84 87.64
2009 0.404 0.058 99.92 99.52 76.96 0.440 0.054 100.00 99.96 93.12
2010 0.412 0.050 100.00 100.00 83.96 0.447 0.052 100.00 100.00 95.36
2011 0.404 0.047 100.00 99.96 81.84 0.454 0.050 100.00 100.00 97.36
2012 0.406 0.046 100.00 99.92 83.20 0.465 0.048 100.00 100.00 98.24
2013 0.419 0.045 100.00 99.92 89.60 0.500 0.045 100.00 100.00 99.92
2014 0.424 0.045 100.00 100.00 91.08 0.506 0.044 100.00 100.00 99.92
Note: Mean denotes the yearly mean of the Moran’s I test statistics over the converged MPI draws of the Gibbs
sampler using a row-normalised contiguity spatial weight matrix. Std reflects the yearly standard deviation of the
Moran’s I test statistics over the converged MPI draws of the Gibbs sampler. The last three columns reveal the
share of MPI draws for which the Moran’s I is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
The test results provide strong support for positive spatial correlation in migration policies across
countries. Starting off at rather small values, the cross-country correlation in migration regulations grad-
ually becomes stronger over the years, both in terms of size and significance. As this pattern corresponds
to the changes in data availability, it is likely that larger confidence intervals hide the spatial correlation
in the earlier years. The average Moran’s I statistic is significant at 10% in more than half of the draws
and, as of 2008, the null of no spatial correlation can be rejected in half the cases even at the 1% signifi-
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Table 2: Moran’s I test using row-standardised inverse-distance weight matrix - Descriptive statistics
MPIE MPIC
Percentage of draws with Percentage of draws with
Year Mean Std p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 Mean Std p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01
1996 0.036 0.039 61.00 47.40 22.84 0.026 0.040 51.12 36.56 16.60
1997 0.040 0.038 65.12 50.56 25.32 0.030 0.038 55.16 40.76 17.68
1998 0.043 0.035 69.64 55.60 27.16 0.034 0.037 59.76 45.00 18.76
1999 0.047 0.034 74.48 59.88 29.36 0.037 0.035 64.40 48.24 21.72
2000 0.050 0.033 78.24 63.36 33.12 0.041 0.034 68.08 52.88 23.20
2001 0.054 0.032 82.60 68.24 35.64 0.044 0.033 73.00 56.12 26.00
2002 0.056 0.030 86.84 72.96 39.56 0.047 0.031 76.64 60.84 28.12
2003 0.059 0.028 90.68 77.28 40.76 0.050 0.029 80.72 64.92 29.80
2004 0.062 0.025 93.28 83.00 45.44 0.052 0.027 85.40 68.20 31.76
2005 0.065 0.023 96.92 88.04 50.36 0.055 0.025 89.32 74.80 33.32
2006 0.068 0.020 98.84 92.68 55.68 0.058 0.023 93.60 80.40 37.80
2007 0.070 0.018 99.88 96.56 62.64 0.062 0.020 96.36 88.40 42.56
2008 0.077 0.016 99.96 99.52 78.64 0.066 0.018 98.48 93.32 52.40
2009 0.079 0.014 100.00 99.84 83.84 0.070 0.016 99.76 97.36 61.36
2010 0.080 0.014 100.00 100.00 87.68 0.074 0.015 99.92 99.20 72.00
2011 0.085 0.013 100.00 100.00 93.28 0.075 0.013 99.96 99.60 77.36
2012 0.094 0.013 100.00 100.00 98.76 0.079 0.013 100.00 99.80 84.48
2013 0.113 0.014 100.00 100.00 99.92 0.085 0.013 100.00 99.96 93.60
2014 0.117 0.016 100.00 100.00 99.96 0.086 0.013 100.00 100.00 95.52
Note: Mean denotes the yearly mean of the Moran’s I test statistics over the converged MPI draws of the Gibbs
sampler using a row-normalised inverse-distance spatial weight matrix. Std reflects the yearly standard deviation of
the Moran’s I test statistics over the converged MPI draws of the Gibbs sampler. The last three columns reveal the
share of MPI draws for which the Moran’s I is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
cance level for both indexes no matter the spatial weight matrix being used. Comparing the Moran’s I
values of MPIE and MPIC shows that while spatial correlation based on the comprehensive indicator is
larger when using the contiguity matrix, this pattern is reversed when the inverse distance weight matrix
is used.
2.5 Selectivity of migration policy
The patterns in migration policy revealed by the indices of policy restrictiveness can be complemented
by adding information on the selectivity of migration policy. Selectivity refers to the circumstance where
entry conditions apply differently to individuals depending on their education level or nationality. In
other words, selectivity relates to restrictiveness as income distribution relates to average income. Given
the multidimensionality of selectivity (e.g. in terms of eduction, occupation, or nationality) and in absence
of a systematical coding of policy measures at the level of each relevant group of immigrants (whether in
levels or changes), the selectivity of migration policy should be considered orthogonal to restrictiveness
and measured and described independently. Ideally, we would compose an index of selectivity for each
dimension.
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We know of only one source (the DEMIG database described above) from which we can derive in-
formation on changes in selectivity of migration policy. Unfortunately, unlike the other indicators, the
DEMIG database is constructed at the level of policy measures instead of county-year pairs. Moreover,
it was not constructed for the use of cross-country comparisons; using it to create a reliable cross-country
measure would require a recoding at the most basic level (de Haas et al., 2015). However, as it is the
only available source on selectivity, we use it to create a simple indicator that measures migration policy
selectivity in terms of skill level.11 Given its obvious methodological problems, this indicator should
not be viewed as an attempt to measure selectivity that is on par with the MPI indexes capturing the
restrictiveness of policy, though.
The DEMIG dataset identifies close to 400 policy measures targeting either high-skilled or low-skilled
migrants, of which the vast majority deal with entry and stay requirements. We labeled these measures
as selectivity-increasing when they lowered the number of low-skilled workers, raised the number of high-
skilled workers, or when they raised the skill-requirements for entry. In contrast, restrictiveness increases
when both the number of high and low-skilled workers decreases or skill requirements rise. The policy
changes were coded negative when they raised selectivity and vice versa. They were weighted using
DEMIG’s assessment of the magnitude of the policy change, ranging from a fine-tuning (1) to a major
policy change (4). As the DEMIG dataset claims to contain a complete list of all policy changes in the
45 countries that it covers, we created the measure of selectivity by simply computing the running total
of such policy changes in each year since the end of World War II.
Restrictiveness turns out to be a bad predictor of selectivity and vice versa. The correlation between
both the level and changes in these variables stands at 0.14 and −0.1, respectively, neither of which is
significantly different from zero. These findings corroborate the idea that selectivity and restrictiveness
are two orthogonal dimensions of migration policy. However, when plotted on a world map (figure 6), it
quickly becomes clear that some of the least restrictive countries according to the MPIC index are also
the most selective, in particular Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the United States. For the most
part, the more restrictive countries are less selective, but there are exceptions to this rule. Germany for
example is both selective and restrictive, while Portugal is relatively open and not-selective.
11While the DEMIG database also contains information on the selectivity based on country of origin, combining this
data into a similar country-year indicator is much harder as the impact of these measures will also depend on the relative
importance of that country of origin in the group of potential migrants. A bilateral index of migration restrictiveness
therefore lies outside of the scope of this paper.
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Figure 6: Indicator of selectivity in 2014 (less selective = darker colour)
3 Determinants of migration policy
3.1 Median voter, interest groups and spatial correlation
Analyses based solely on social welfare considerations typically predict a much lager number of immi-
grants than what is actually observed. Typically, this discrepancy is explained from a political economy
perspective that takes the conflicting interests of different population groups with respect to immigra-
tion into account. A general framework of the political economy model is given by Rodrik (1995) (and
adopted by Facchini and Mayda, 2009), in which (migration) policy is the outcome of policy ‘demand’
and ‘supply’. Policy demand is represented by the collective action of economic agents based on their
individual preferences with respect to immigration and policy supply by the institutional structure of
public policy based on politicians’ preferences (e.g. in terms of their re-election). Models of immigration
policy of this type predominantly deal with the ‘demand side’ of immigration policy, focussing on the
economic and non-economic factors that determine individual attitudes towards immigration that result
in collective action through various channels.
With respect to the economic factors that influence individuals’ attitude towards immigration, Razin
and Sadka (2000) and Facchini and Mayda (2009) distinguish between the labour market, the welfare
state (redistribution) and the efficiency (immigration surplus) effects. The demand-side preferences are
also shaped by non-economic considerations such as political power, cultural aversion or ‘compositional
amenities’ (Card et al., 2012). It is unclear which of these factors will eventually dominate. Whereas
Facchini and Mayda (2009), Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) and Facchini et al. (2011) point to the impact
of economic factors shaping the attitudes towards immigration or decision making, Hix and Noury (2007)
conclude that political determinants are more important and Card et al. (2012) find that concerns over
compositional amenities significantly outweigh conventional economic concerns such as the impact on
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taxes and wages.
Individual preferences with respect to immigration are channeled to policy demand by means of
collective action, which is the basis of the median voter model developed by Benhabib (1996). In a
straightforward setting (constant returns to scale production using labour and human or physical capital),
he showed that the median voter will prefer the type of immigration that is the most complementary to her
own endowments if immigration policy is determined by majority voting, but some of the implications
of this model are less realistic. Razin and Sadka (2000) distinguish between social groups based on
two criteria (skills and age) instead of only skills. Although more advanced median voter models have
fewer radical implications, this usually comes at the expense of increasingly ambiguous conclusions with
respect to the determinants of immigration policy. For instance, when Razin et al. (2009) allow for
dynamic political economy considerations (following Ortega, 2005) as well as different voting strategies,
they find that immigration policy reflects several dimensions that are difficult to bring back to observable
characteristics of the median voter.
Moreover, from a median voter perspective, actual migration policies also seem more open than one
would expect. Several explanations for this discrepancy have been offered: policy toughness could already
be high in general; immigrant policies aimed at controlling economic migration flows might be inefficient;
the policies might affect the composition of immigration flows rather than their level; or it might be due to
lobbying activities of special interest groups. Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) propose a simplified pressure
group model, with empirical evidence provided by Facchini et al. (2011). However, Milner and Tingley
(2011) argue that pressure groups are more likely to influence specific measures rather than shaping
overall immigration policy. They show that both economic self-interest and ideological determinants can
be powerful determinants of immigration policy but that their relative importance depends upon the
specific policy dimension under consideration.
Finally, supported by the preliminary Moran’s I-tests presented in the previous section, we expect that
a country does not determine its (immigration) policy in isolation from other (host) countries. Though
the theoretical literature has not paid much attention to interdependence in migration policies, Giordani
and Ruta (2013) formally show that for symmetrical countries, choosing the same level of openness as
their neighbouring countries is optimal.
3.2 Empirical specification and estimation issues
To explain the restrictiveness of immigration policy, we need proxies for the characteristics of the median
voter as well as for the strength or influence of interest groups. Because we also account for cross-country
policy correlation, our estimations require a balanced panel structure. As a result, data availability and
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the sample selection bias it may induce seriously constrain the number of empirical proxies that can be
used.12 Nevertheless, we can control for the theoretically most relevant observable characteristic of the
median voter: i.e. her age. Specifically, we include the old age dependency ratio (as a proxy for population
ageing) and public welfare expenditures related to old age (in terms of GDP).13 The political preferences
of the median voter are proxied by past migration flows as a share of the host country population.
Data availability also seriously hampers the inclusion of indicators of interest groups’ efforts to in-
fluence migration policy to their benefit. Theoretically, this is represented by the financial expenditures
for lobbying, but (comparable) data on lobbying are unfortunately missing for many countries. Instead,
we proxy interest group activity by annual GDP growth (as an indicator of labour demand dynamics)
and by labour union membership (following Facchini and Mayda, 2009). The latter acts as an indicator
of organisational strength and institutional pressure of the labour movement, though its signal can be
very distorted.14 Similar to the empirical analysis of trade policy, some of these indicators might capture
different determinants according to different theories (see e.g. Gawande and Krishna, 2003). GDP growth
could for instance also be interpreted as an indicator of immigration surplus which is a relevant economic
interest of the median voter. In addition, the median voter’s voting strategy (sincere or strategic) or
forward looking behaviour (the impact of immigration on future political power) remain unobserved.
Finally, we include country fixed effects as a simple and efficient way to control for unobserved
heterogeneity or control variables that do not vary over time. Given the poor quality of available annual
data, this is the most appropriate way to control for the other main characteristic of the median voter
besides age, i.e. skills. This results in the following empirical specification:
MPIit = ρ W MPIit + β lnXit + αi + εit, (7)
12For example, to capture attitudes towards immigrants we extracted the replies to two questions from the 4th and 5th
wave of the World Value Surveys. The waves span the period 1999-2004 and 2005-2009, respectively, but the construction of
an annual series of attitudes towards immigrants in each country based on these data is impossible. Furthermore, we tried
to approximate labour market dynamics using OECDStat employment rates (for native- and foreign-born by educational
attainment) and ILO estimates of the employment to population ratio aged either 15+ or 15 to 24. Other indicators that
were considered are the share of agriculture and construction in GDP (available for the period 1990-2013 but with gaps);
the GINI index; and public spending on education and health in percentage of GDP, all of which are available from the
World Development Indicators for the period 1960 to 2014 (with gaps). Yet, data availability for all these measures remains
too poor to construct a sufficiently large panel dataset that would allow to obtain accurate estimation results.
13We also experimented with a measure of skill abundance of the working population calculated as the share of the
population aged 25 to 34 without tertiary education, compiled from United Nations and OECD population statistics.
However, the many missing values reduced the sample size to such an extent that we decided not to include it in our
empirical analysis.
14The union membership ratio of the workforce in France, for instance, is comparable to (if not lower than) that of the
US, despite substantial differences in the impact of unions on public policy. As alternative proxies for the strength of special
interest groups, we also considered measures of union density and union coverage available at ILO, but their availability is
limited to the periods 2001-2011 and 2002-2012, respectively.
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where MPIit is an indicator of migration policy openness in country i at time t (i.e. either MPI
E
it or
MPICit ), lnXit is the vector of explanatory variables in logs, αi denotes the country fixed effects (FE), and
εit is an i.i.d. error term. Spatial correlation in migration policy is assumed to have a spatial autoregressive
(SAR) structure, where W denotes a row-standardised contiguity or inverse-distance weight matrix.
Data on GDP growth are taken from the World Development Indicators. Data on the old age depen-
dency ratio, old age public expenditures, past migration flows and the union membership of wage earners
are obtained from the OECD statistics. The largest possible balanced dataset includes 23 countries and
19 years.15
It could be argued that migration policy is trend stationary, i.e. when a country becomes temporarily
less open to immigrants following e.g. a country-specific shock it will later return to the level implied by
the trend so that there is no permanent decrease in openness. If this is the case, the model should be
estimated in first differences. To test for this, we run two panel unit root tests developed by Maddala and
Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) on the estimated residuals. The null hypothesis of a unit root is, however,
always rejected, meaning that we can rely on super-consistency of the OLS estimator to produce reliable
estimates for the equations in levels.16
3.3 Estimation results
Table 3 reports the estimation results for four specifications of the SAR model (which differ in the set of
explanatory variables that is included) and this for both MPIE and MPIC . All specifications include
a spatial lag and are estimated using a Gibbs sampler. The reported coefficients and corresponding p-
values in brackets reported in the first two rows for each variable ignore the fact that MPI is an estimated
variable. The third and fourth rows, subsequently, account for the uncertainty in the migration policy
indicators by making use of the different draws of MPIE and MPIC . In each iteration, the Gibbs sampler
draws a value from the distribution of the MPI indexes (obtained from the state-space model) which is
then used to compute the distribution of the parameters of the SAR model (β and γ) to ultimately get
their expected values and standard deviations.17
In line with expectations, we find a strong negative impact of past migration flows on the openness
of entry policies, suggesting that admission procedures become tougher as more immigrants settle in the
15Our sample includes the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
16Technically, we do not estimate our model using OLS but rely on straightforward extensions of it, i.e. the FE and SAR
estimators.
17Using the draw of the MPI value, the distribution of β and γ parameters is computed and drawn from. These draws
are saved and the next iteration is started. The converged draws can subsequently be used to compute the expected values,
standard deviations and significance of the parameters.
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Table 3: Determinants of migration policy - Contiguity spatial weight matrix
MPIE MPIC
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Past migration -0.078∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
-0.086 -0.104 -0.070 -0.157∗∗ 0.121 0.113 0.124 0.081
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.079)
GDP growth 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006 0.008 0.010∗ -0.003 -0.009∗∗ -0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.016 0.009 0.011 0.013 -0.005 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Old age expenditures 0.463∗∗∗ 0.082 0.130 0.506∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.129) (0.125) (0.115) (0.103) (0.109)
0.496 0.047 0.078 0.462 0.349 0.257
(0.389) (0.367) (0.371) (0.438) (0.406) (0.412)
Dependency ratio -2.460∗∗∗ -1.690∗∗∗ -1.251∗∗∗ -0.597∗ 0.121 0.018
(0.418) (0.349) (0.360) (0.333) (0.272) (0.289)
-2.825∗∗ -1.984∗ -1.342 -0.715 -0.046 -0.029
(1.222) (1.118) (1.099) (1.410) (1.283) (1.282)
Union membership 0.802∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.101) (0.117) (0.103) (0.081) (0.089)
0.990∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗ 0.550∗ 0.466 0.217 0.361
(0.372) (0.279) (0.334) (0.426) (0.331) (0.387)
Spatial lag ρˆ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) (0.043)
0.244∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.096 0.086 0.102 0.109
(0.098) (0.096) (0.095) (0.093) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.120)
Maddala-Wu test stat 121.643 105.397 116.207 120.804 95.380 107.354 93.257 99.493
Maddala-Wu p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Choi test stat 7.886 5.858 7.320 7.799 5.148 6.058 4.927 5.577
Choi p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 368 384 368 368 368 384 368 368
Notes: For each variable, the first two rows correspond to the SAR estimations without accounting for uncertainty
in the MPI measure, while the third and fourth row report results from the SAR estimations that are robust to the
uncertainty in the MPI measure. P -values between brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively. To obtain the largest possible sample, the explanatory variables are lagged three periods. All
explanatory variables except GDP growth are transformed to logarithms.
country. However, this effect disappears if the model is estimated using an inverse-distance weight matrix
rather than the contiguity weight matrix and it is never significant in the robust regressions. The impact
of past migration flows on the composite migration policy indicator, on the other hand, is positively
significant in the non-robust regressions, regardless of the spatial weight matrix that is used. This seems
to indicate that more immigration leads to more accommodating staying conditions and/or integration
regulations for those who do get in. This is not surprising given that host countries may experience larger
benefits from better integrated immigrants when this implies, for instance, easier access to work. Even
so, this positive effect disappears as soon as uncertainty in the indicator of migration policy is accounted
for.
The impact of GDP growth is ambiguous. When using the contiguity weight matrix, it is positive
and significant in the complete model explaining entry policy, but it negative affects the comprehensive
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Table 4: Determinants of migration policy - Inverse-distance spatial weight matrix
MPIE MPIC
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Past migration 0.001 -0.008 0.017 -0.021 0.118∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
-0.026 -0.038 -0.007 -0.064 0.125 0.117 0.129 0.083
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.062) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.079)
GDP growth 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
0.009 0.004 0.004 0.006 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Old age expenditures 0.311∗∗∗ -0.109 0.121 0.422∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.171∗
(0.114) (0.117) (0.115) (0.120) (0.096) (0.108)
0.372 -0.083 0.083 0.434 0.305 0.200
(0.382) (0.360) (0.361) (0.440) (0.406) (0.414)
Dependency ratio -2.598∗∗∗ -2.028∗∗∗ -1.927∗∗∗ -0.821∗∗ -0.173 0.033
(0.357) (0.310) (0.320) (0.327) (0.314) (0.329)
-2.799∗∗ -2.153∗ -1.845 -0.797 -0.145 -0.035
(1.251) (1.144) (1.141) (1.438) (1.303) (1.310)
Union membership 0.450∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.061 0.584∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.085) (0.109) (0.103) (0.083) (0.101)
0.681∗ 0.341 0.250 0.525 0.267 0.409
(0.360) (0.270) (0.328) (0.427) (0.334) (0.390)
Spatial lag ρˆ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.033) (0.040) (0.031) (0.075) (0.084) (0.079) (0.083)
0.560∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.154 0.148 0.151 0.142
(0.123) (0.118) (0.118) (0.104) (0.223) (0.227) (0.224) (0.224)
Maddala-Wu test stat 100.462 111.933 126.469 106.912 115.959 101.825 111.192 100.927
Maddala-Wu p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Choi test stat 5.678 6.525 8.389 6.351 7.294 5.494 6.797 5.727
Choi p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 368 384 368 368 368 384 368 368
Notes: For each variable, the first two rows correspond to the SAR estimations without accounting for uncertainty
in the MPI measure, while the third and fourth row report results from the SAR estimations that are robust to the
uncertainty in the MPI measure. P -values between brackets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively. To obtain the largest possible sample, the explanatory variables are lagged three periods. All
explanatory variables except GDP growth are transformed to logarithms.
migration policy index. However, it is not significant using the inverse-distance weight matrix and never
significant in the robust regressions. Similarly, the positive significant effect of public welfare expenditures
related to old age on both policy indicators, which is in line with theoretical predictions, disappears
when uncertainty in these indexes is taken into account. Population ageing as captured by the old age
dependency ratio, on the other hand, appears with a significant negative sign in both the non-robust
and robust estimations. Contrary to the predictions of the median voter model of e.g. Razin and Sadka
(2000), we find that having an older population results in a less open migration policy (once we control for
the effect of old age expenditures), although this effect is only robust for the entry immigration index.18
Consequently, it seems that the voting behaviour of the elderly is driven less by economic considerations
18Boeri and Bru¨cker (2005) report a similar finding for the EU15 countries with respect to the labour market liberalisation
for citizens of the new EU member states.
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- i.e. the (partial) relief immigration might provide to cope with the burden of an ageing population -
but rather dominated by other motivations or cultural concerns.19 Re-estimating the model excluding
either old age expenditures (specification 2) or the old age dependency ratio (specification 3) does not
significantly alter these findings.
Furthermore, in the non-robust estimations, we obtain a positive significant impact of union mem-
bership. This contradicts the prediction of the interest group approach as trade unions are expected
to organise primarily those domestic workers for whom immigrant workers form the closest substitute.
The significant impact is preserved in the robust estimations for entry policies but not for the composite
migration policy indicator. Yet, as argued above, union membership is a rather poor proxy of the labour
movement’s organisational strength and institutional pressure and might hence produce misleading con-
jectures. Also, the influence of union strength on migration policies is expected to be negative only if
immigration is low-skilled (i.e. we generally expect much less opposition against an inflow of high-skilled
immigrants), which is not necessarily the case. In order to test whether the inclusion of union member-
ship also distorts the estimated impact of the other determinants, we re-estimated the model without
it. Except for the impact of the old age dependency ratio which now becomes insignificant in the robust
regressions, this does not alter our main findings.
Finally, the most important finding concerns the significantly positive coefficient for the spatial lag
of entry (i.e. immigration) policy. This is the case in all four specifications, in both the non-robust
and robust estimations. The effect varies between 0.24 and 0.30 using a contiguity-based spatial weight
matrix and between 0.56 and 0.64 based on the inverse-distance spatial weight matrix. It thus seems that
changes in the restrictiveness of admission procedures in one country have direct implications for similar
procedures in other countries. The fact that spatial correlation is larger based on the inverse-distance
matrix might indicate that it captures a tendency towards harmonisation (like in the EU member states,
though at this stage this mainly concerns common rules for family reunion and the single permit directive)
or peer reference effects (the policy impact of a shock on voting preferences in a peer country).20 The
spatial autoregressive coefficient (ρˆ) is only robustly significant for immigration entry policy (MPIE),
but not for the more comprehensive migration policy index (MPIC), though. This can be an indication
of a still substantial national margin in migration policies, in particular in the less visible policy segments
such as staying conditions and integration rights. This is to some extent surprising given that many of
19This in line with the finding by Card et al. (2012) that compositional concerns explain more than two-thirds of the
differences in -negative- opinions about immigration policy between young and older respondents, a finding that is robust
across countries.
20To the extent that the spatial dependence is caused primarily by competition between countries, we would expect a
larger spatial correlation for contiguous countries.
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the host countries of immigration in our sample could be considered quite symmetrical.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we bring together all publicly available indicators of migration policy to construct indexes
capturing countries’ openness of regulations in three dimensions: entry, stay and integration. These three
indexes are then brought together in a comprehensive index of the restrictiveness of migration policy.
To create these indicators, we rely on a Bayesian state-space model that is able to differentiate
between the individual measures in terms of their reliability. By using the time-dependence in the
underlying indicators and circumventing the problem of missing observations, the state-space model can
provide more stable and reliable estimates. It significantly increases data availability and coverage without
imputations or other ad-hoc manipulations. Moreover, the reliability of the migration policy indicators
can easily be taken into account in any subsequent computations or regressions.
The estimated migration policy indexes are then used to empirically analyse the influence of determi-
nants taken from the major political economy hypotheses typically used to explain the restrictiveness of
migration policies in the OECD as well as the impact of potential interdependence in migration policies
across countries. We estimate a spatial autoregressive model using a Gibbs sampling approach to take the
uncertainty in the constructed policy indexes into account. Our results provide significant indications of
a positive cross-country correlation in the restrictiveness of migration policy, in particular in immigration
entry policy. The sign and significance of the determinants in our estimations suggest that migration
policy is rooted in a more complex framework where dynamic political economy and strategic motivations
are taken into account, or in which political or cultural rather than economic arguments tend to prevail.
A natural direction for future research includes a deeper exploration of selectivity in migration policy
in addition to its restrictiveness discussed in this paper. A number of entry conditions apply differently to
individuals with a different level of education, and a similar level of restrictiveness can hide different levels
of selectivity. Similarly, some policies are bilateral in nature. A better understanding of this selectivity
both in terms of skill levels and nationality would allow a more thorough understanding of migration
policy.
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A Selection of the migration policy indicators
Table 5: Selection of the migration policy indicators
Indicator Availability Summary
Policy change dummy
(OP) (Mayda, 2010;
Ortega and Peri,
2009)
22 Western coun-
tries; 1980-2006
The original dummy was created based on an extensive review of migration
laws by Mayda and Patel (2004) which was later extended by Ortega and Peri
(2009) by including information from the Social Reforms database (2007) from
the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti. It identifies the timing and direction of
policy changes (loosening vs. tightening) related to the size of immigration flows
as opposed to, for example, issues of citizenship or provisions on the entry of
asylum seekers. In the first year, each country’s immigration policy is initialised
at zero. This means that only the within-country variation over time can be used,
but that the level of the index cannot be compared over countries. The authors
categorised each immigration reform as decreasing, maintaining or increasing the
tightness of immigration laws, which was coded as minus one, zero or plus one,
respectively.
International Im-
migration Policies
Database (IIPD)
(United Nations)
193 UN members
and 3 non-UN
members; 1976-2013
We select six indicators that measure whether or not governments had policies in
place aimed at influencing the level of migration (i.e. raise, maintain or lower the
level of permanent settlement, temporary labour migration, migration for family
reunification and migration of highly skilled workers), policies that foster the
integration of non-nationals in the host society, or naturalisation policies.21 They
offer a reflection of the change in overall toughness of the policy stance, though
not on its level. The first four indicators were coded 1 and 2 for policies aimed
at ‘lowering’ and ‘maintaining’ the level of migration; 3 when no intervention
was taken; and 4 for policies aimed at ‘raising’ migration inflows. The last two
indicators take the value 1 when there are no such policies in place; 3 if there are;
and 2 if there are but naturalisation entitlement is limited to a certain category
of immigrants or where residency requirement is ten years or longer.
Migrant Integra-
tion Policy Index
(MIPEX) (Niessen
et al., 2007; Huddle-
ston et al., 2015)
38 Western coun-
tries; 2007-2014
The index covers eight policy areas which define a migrant’s opportunities to
participate in European societies: labour market mobility, family reunion, edu-
cation, health, permanent residence, political participation, access to nationality
and anti-discrimination. Specifically, it provides information on 167 policy in-
dicators, i.e. questions related to specific policy components corresponding to
Council of Europe Conventions or European Community Directives. Each of
them takes a value between 0 and 100 with higher values indicating higher levels
of openness. All sub-indicators are retained.
Migration component
of the Commitment
to Development Index
(CDI) (Grieco and
Hamilton, 2004)
22 Western coun-
tries; 2003-2011
The CDI assesses national effort in seven policy areas including migration. This
information was compiled from a variety of sources including the OECD and
OECD-DAC, the World Bank, UNHCR, UNFCCC, CEPII, IEA, and other or-
ganisations, along with inputs from academic researchers. It considers migration
of both skilled and especially unskilled people from developing countries, open-
ness to students from poor countries and aid to refugees and asylum seekers.
However, only one of the indicators satisfies the criteria above and is retained:
the proportion of non-DAC students in all foreign students.22
21We do not consider the indicators related to emigration or those reporting government views on migration levels.
22The other two indicators are measured as the gross inflow of migrants from developing countries and the net increase
in the number of unskilled migrant residents from developing countries, respectively. Hence, we do not consider them in
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Table 5: Selection of the migration policy indicators
Indicator Availability Summary
Multiculturalism
Policy Index (MCPI)
(Queen’s University)
21 Western coun-
tries; 1980, 2000 and
2010
The project provides three indexes: one for immigrant groups, one related to
historic national minorities and one related to indigenous peoples. We consider
only the first one which examines the extent to which governments adopted each
of the following eight policies: (i) constitutional, legislative or parliamentary
affirmation of multiculturalism; (ii) the adoption of multiculturalism in school
curriculum; (iii) the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate
of public media or media licensing; (iv) exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-
closing legislation etc; (v) allowing dual citizenship; (vi) the funding of ethnic
group organisations to support cultural activities; (vii) the funding of bilingual
education or mother-tongue instruction; (viii) affirmative action for disadvan-
taged immigrant groups. The required information is gathered from policy doc-
uments, program guidelines, legislation, government news releases and secondary
sources. Each indicator is coded 0 for ‘no’; 1 for ‘partially’; and 2 for ‘yes’.
Inventory of Mi-
gration Policies
constructed by the
Fondazione Rodolfo
DeBenedetti (IMP)
(Jacobs, 2011)
12 EU15 countries;
1990-2005.
It collects information about migration policy reforms distinguishing changes
in migration policy along six different dimensions: the number of admission
requirements, duration of the first stay, staying requirements, number of years
to obtain a permanent residence permit, number of administrations involved
and the existence of quotas. The six dimensions were initially expressed either in
different units or in an ordinal scale specific to each item. To make the indicators
comparable across countries and over time, they have been converted in cardinal
scores and normalised to a range from 0 to 6, with higher score representing
stricter regulation.
B List of the migration policy indicators
Table 6: List of the migration policy indicators, ordered according to their correlation with MPIC
Indicator Source Type Correlation
MPIE MPIC
LTR language support MIPEX Stay 0.79
Educational guidance at all levels MIPEX Integration 0.75
LTR Integration form MIPEX Stay 0.73
The adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum MCPI Integration 0.69
In-country support MIPEX Entry −0.06 0.66
Law covers positive action measures MIPEX Integration 0.65
Affirmation of multiculturalism MCPI Integration 0.64
Naturalisation language courses MIPEX Integration 0.63
Residence period MIPEX Stay 0.62
Active information policy MIPEX Integration 0.61
Measures to address educational situation of migrant groups MIPEX Integration 0.60
Dependent adult children MIPEX Entry 0.56 0.57
Ethnic representation/sensitivity in public media MCPI Integration 0.57
Measures to support migrant parents and communities MIPEX Integration 0.56
Naturalisation language support MIPEX Integration 0.56
Naturalisation Integration support MIPEX Integration 0.56
Access to higher education MIPEX Integration 0.55
In-country Integration form MIPEX Entry 0.99 0.55
Language instruction standards MIPEX Integration 0.53
Naturalisation Integration courses MIPEX Integration 0.53
Active information policy MIPEX Integration 0.53
order to avoid endogeneity bias in the empirical analysis.
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Table 6: List of the migration policy indicators, ordered according to their correlation with MPIC
Indicator Source Type Correlation
MPIE MPIC
In-country exemption MIPEX Entry −0.28 0.52
Minor children MIPEX Entry 0.74 0.52
State supported information initiatives MIPEX Integration 0.52
Immediate access to self employment MIPEX Integration 0.52
Delivery of immigrant cultures MIPEX Integration 0.52
Ensuring compliance of mainstream legislation MIPEX Integration 0.52
Public funding/support for national immigrant bodies MIPEX Integration 0.51
Periods of absence allowed MIPEX Stay 0.51
Public funding/support for immigrant bodies at local level in capital city MIPEX Integration 0.50
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children MIPEX Entry 0.20 0.50
Public funding/support for immigrant bodies in city ... MIPEX Integration 0.49
Languages MIPEX Integration 0.49
Option to learn immigrant languages MIPEX Integration 0.48
In-country cost MIPEX Entry 0.64 0.48
Economic resources MIPEX Entry 0.42 0.48
Pre-Entry Integration form MIPEX Entry 0.42 0.47
The funding of ethnic group organizations or activities MCPI Integration 0.46
Access to and supply of public goods and services, including health MIPEX Integration 0.46
Economic Integration measures of TCNs MIPEX Integration 0.45
Access to public sector MIPEX Integration 0.45
Employment MIPEX Integration 0.45
Law covers discrimination by association MIPEX Integration 0.45
Birth-right citizenship for second generation MIPEX Integration 0.45
Access to pre-primary education and compulsory education MIPEX Integration 0.44
Dual nationality for second/third generation MIPEX Integration 0.44
a. Partners MIPEX Entry −0.18 0.43
Naturalisation language level MIPEX Integration 0.43
In-country language form MIPEX Entry 0.79 0.43
Option to learn immigrant cultures MIPEX Integration 0.42
Access to vocational training MIPEX Integration 0.42
Communicative/academic fluency MIPEX Integration 0.42
Cost/availability of interpreters MIPEX Integration 0.42
Access to and supply of public goods and services, including housing MIPEX Integration 0.42
Education MIPEX Integration 0.42
Public funding/support for regional immigrant bodies MIPEX Integration 0.42
Economic resources MIPEX Stay 0.42
Renewable permit MIPEX Stay 0.41
Access to housing MIPEX Integration 0.41
The funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction MCPI Integration 0.41
Criminal record MIPEX Integration 0.40
Social protection MIPEX Integration 0.40
Policy to influence the level of documented immigration into the country IIPD Entry 0.22 0.39
Naturalisation language exemption MIPEX Integration 0.39
Regular consultation MIPEX Integration 0.39
Birth-right citizenship for third generation MIPEX Integration 0.39
Migrant pupil monitoring MIPEX Integration 0.38
Withdrawal grounds MIPEX Integration 0.38
b. Age limits MIPEX Entry 0.37 0.38
Law covers direct/indirect discrimination, harassment, instruction MIPEX Integration 0.37
Public bodies obliged to promote equality MIPEX Integration 0.36
Pre-Entry support MIPEX Entry 0.06 0.36
Grounds for rejection, withdrawal, refusal MIPEX Entry 0.31 0.36
Active information policy and dialogue MIPEX Integration 0.36
Legal protection MIPEX Integration 0.35
Special exemptions for asylum-seekers MIPEX Integration 0.35
Economic Integration measures of youth and women MIPEX Integration 0.35
Delivery of immigrant languages MIPEX Integration 0.35
Partners of nationals MIPEX Integration 0.33
Measures to counter segregation of migrant pupils and promote Integration MIPEX Integration 0.33
Duration of validity of permit MIPEX Stay 0.33
Residence period MIPEX Entry 0.19 0.33
Number of administrations involved IMP Entry 0.32 0.32
Exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or court cases) MCPI Integration 0.32
Access to self employment MIPEX Integration 0.32
Duration of validity of permit MIPEX Entry 0.31 0.32
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Table 6: List of the migration policy indicators, ordered according to their correlation with MPIC
Indicator Source Type Correlation
MPIE MPIC
Encouraging diversity in the health service workforce MIPEX Integration 0.32
Naturalisation Integration form MIPEX Integration 0.32
Range of sanctions MIPEX Integration 0.32
Measures to bring migrants into the teacher workforce MIPEX Integration 0.32
Coverage for legal migrants MIPEX Integration 0.32
LTR language form MIPEX Stay 0.32
Access to education and training MIPEX Entry −0.02 0.32
Access to private sector MIPEX Integration 0.32
Special exemptions for undocumented migrants MIPEX Integration 0.31
Policy to influence the level of permanent settlement IIPD Entry/Stay 0.31
LTR language courses MIPEX Stay 0.31
Access to employment and self-employment MIPEX Entry −0.13 0.30
Economic resources MIPEX Integration 0.30
Public employment services MIPEX Integration 0.30
Residence period MIPEX Integration 0.30
Accommodation MIPEX Entry 0.28 0.30
Immediate access to labour market MIPEX Integration 0.29
”Health in all policies” approach MIPEX Integration 0.29
Permit duration required MIPEX Entry 0.28 0.28
Recognition of academic qualifications MIPEX Integration 0.28
Language instruction MIPEX Integration 0.28
Adapting curriculum to reflect diversity MIPEX Integration 0.28
Methods of dissemination MIPEX Integration 0.28
Mandate of specialised equality body MIPEX Integration 0.28
Personal circumstances considered MIPEX Entry −0.33 0.27
Information for service providers about migrants’ entitlements MIPEX Integration 0.27
Legal protection MIPEX Stay 0.26
Right to vote in local elections MIPEX Integration 0.26
Dependent parents/grandparents MIPEX Entry 0.42 0.26
Legal protection MIPEX Entry −0.14 0.26
Right to vote in national elections MIPEX Integration 0.25
Assessment of prior learning MIPEX Integration 0.25
Prohibitions in law MIPEX Integration 0.25
Range of legal actions MIPEX Integration 0.24
Recognition of professional qualifications MIPEX Integration 0.24
Support to access public employment services MIPEX Integration 0.24
Right to vote in regional elections MIPEX Integration 0.24
Groups MIPEX Integration 0.24
In-country language level MIPEX Entry 0.83 0.24
Groups MIPEX Integration 0.24
Regular consultation MIPEX Integration 0.24
Whole organisation approach MIPEX Integration 0.24
Statelenssness protections MIPEX Integration 0.23
Working conditions MIPEX Integration 0.23
Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups MCPI Integration 0.23
School curriculum to reflect diversity MIPEX Integration 0.23
Powers as quasi-judicial body MIPEX Integration 0.22
Naturalisation Integration cost MIPEX Integration 0.22
Requirement for ’culturally competent’ or ’diversity-sensitive’ services MIPEX Integration 0.22
Access to employment MIPEX Integration 0.22
Leadership by government MIPEX Integration 0.22
Adapting daily school life to reflect diversity MIPEX Integration 0.22
Discretionary powers in refusal MIPEX Integration 0.22
Support for research on migrant health MIPEX Integration 0.21
Policy to influence the level of family reunification IIPD Entry 0.27 0.21
Spouses of nationals MIPEX Integration 0.21
Tuition for foreign students relative to nationals. CDI Entry 0.02 0.21
Withdrawal time limits MIPEX Integration 0.21
Expulsion precluded MIPEX Stay 0.21
Naturalisation Integration exemption MIPEX Integration 0.21
Pre-Entry language form MIPEX Entry 0.64 0.20
Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, ... MIPEX Entry −0.01 0.20
Membership in trade unions MIPEX Integration 0.20
Involvement of migrants in information provision, service design ... MIPEX Integration 0.20
Compulsory education as a legal right MIPEX Integration 0.20
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Table 6: List of the migration policy indicators, ordered according to their correlation with MPIC
Indicator Source Type Correlation
MPIE MPIC
Languages MIPEX Integration 0.19
Special exemptions for legal migrants MIPEX Integration 0.19
Periods of prior-absence allowed MIPEX Stay 0.19
Study grants MIPEX Integration 0.19
Legal standing in procedures MIPEX Integration 0.19
Costs of application MIPEX Stay 0.18
Powers to instigate proceedings and enforce findings MIPEX Integration 0.18
In-country courses MIPEX Entry 0.11 0.17
Costs of application MIPEX Integration 0.17
Allows dual citizenship (Yes, partially or no) MCPI Integration 0.17
Access to housing MIPEX Entry 0.00 0.17
Specific methods MIPEX Integration 0.17
Consultation representativeness MIPEX Integration 0.17
Protection against victimisation MIPEX Integration 0.16
Involvement of migrant stakeholders MIPEX Integration 0.16
Consultation powers MIPEX Integration 0.16
Regular consultation MIPEX Integration 0.16
Validation of skills MIPEX Integration 0.16
Adapting methods MIPEX Integration 0.15
Powers to assists victims MIPEX Integration 0.15
Access to social security MIPEX Integration 0.15
Legal provisions to allow immigrants to become naturalised citizens IIPD Integration 0.15
Right to association MIPEX Integration 0.15
LTR language exemption MIPEX Stay 0.14
Sanctions for reporting MIPEX Integration 0.14
Additional grounds for refusal MIPEX Integration 0.14
Good character MIPEX Integration 0.14
Provision of ‘cultural mediators’ MIPEX Integration 0.13
Policy on Integration of non-nationals IIPD Integration 0.13
Access to social benefits MIPEX Entry 0.04 0.13
Right to stand in local elections MIPEX Integration 0.11
Renunciation requirement MIPEX Integration 0.11
Training and education of health service staff MIPEX Integration 0.11
Permits considered MIPEX Stay 0.11
Law covers multiple discrimination MIPEX Integration 0.11
Shift in burden of proof in procedures MIPEX Integration 0.10
Access to housing MIPEX Integration 0.10
Teacher training to reflect diversity MIPEX Integration 0.10
Membership in political parties MIPEX Integration 0.10
Education and vocational training MIPEX Integration 0.10
Law accepts situation testing MIPEX Integration 0.08
Methods of dissemination MIPEX Integration 0.08
Naturalisation language cost MIPEX Integration 0.07
State facilitation of recognition of qualifications MIPEX Integration 0.07
Regular consultation MIPEX Integration 0.06
Methods of interpretation MIPEX Integration 0.06
Staying requirements IMP Stay 0.06
State assistance for victims MIPEX Integration 0.05
Involvement of stakeholders MIPEX Integration 0.05
Collection of data on migrant health MIPEX Integration 0.04
Conditions for undocumented migrants MIPEX Integration 0.03
Personal circumstances considered before expulsion MIPEX Stay 0.03
Quotas IMP Entry −0.27 0.03
Time counted as pupil/student MIPEX Stay 0.02
Duration of the first stay IMP Entry 0.39 0.02
Consultation powers MIPEX Integration 0.02
Pre-Entry exemption MIPEX Entry 0.15 0.02
Pre-Entry courses MIPEX Entry 0.22 0.01
Consultation representativeness MIPEX Integration 0.01
Cost of application MIPEX Entry 0.06 0.01
Renunciation exemptions MIPEX Integration 0.01
Permits considered MIPEX Entry 0.12 0.01
Consultation composition MIPEX Integration 0.00
Consultation composition MIPEX Integration 0.00
Consultation powers MIPEX Integration −0.01
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Table 6: List of the migration policy indicators, ordered according to their correlation with MPIC
Indicator Source Type Correlation
MPIE MPIC
Policy to influence the level of highly skilled workers IIPD Entry/Stay −0.01
LTR language level MIPEX Stay −0.01
Administrative discretion and documentation for legal migrants MIPEX Integration −0.01
Conditions for legal migrants MIPEX Integration −0.03
Role of legal entities in proceedings MIPEX Integration −0.03
Conditions for asylum-seekers MIPEX Integration −0.04
Maximum duration of procedure MIPEX Integration −0.04
Maximum duration of procedure MIPEX Entry 0.21 −0.04
Coverage for asylum-seekers MIPEX Integration −0.04
Law applies to natural MIPEX Integration −0.05
Law applies to public sector MIPEX Integration −0.05
Consultation leadership MIPEX Integration −0.06
Obligation to report MIPEX Integration −0.06
Teacher training to reflect migrants’ learning needs MIPEX Integration −0.06
Years to obtain a permanent residence permit IMP Stay −0.07
Pre-Entry cost MIPEX Entry 0.32 −0.07
Consultation representativeness MIPEX Integration −0.09
Grounds for rejection, withdrawal, refusal MIPEX Stay −0.10
Consultation leadership MIPEX Integration −0.10
Access to non-compulsory education MIPEX Integration −0.11
Administrative discretion and documentation for undocumented migrants MIPEX Integration −0.13
Periods of prior-absence allowed MIPEX Integration −0.13
Consultation powers MIPEX Integration −0.15
Access to social security and assistance MIPEX Integration −0.16
Consultation representativeness MIPEX Integration −0.16
Coverage for undocumented migrants MIPEX Integration −0.17
Procedures available for victims MIPEX Integration −0.18
Administrative discretion and documentation for asylum-seekers MIPEX Integration −0.18
Number of admission requirements IMP Entry −0.32 −0.18
Groups MIPEX Integration −0.20
Consultation composition MIPEX Integration −0.21
Consultation leadership MIPEX Integration −0.22
Permits considered MIPEX Integration −0.23
Maximum duration of procedure MIPEX Stay −0.25
Consultation leadership MIPEX Integration −0.28
Consultation composition MIPEX Integration −0.28
LTR language cost MIPEX Stay −0.31
‘loosening’ Entry laws OP Entry −0.35 −0.51
‘loosening’ Stay laws OP Stay −0.56
C Estimation
Estimating the state-space model requires us to find the optimal values of both the parameters of the
measurement equation (c, z and H), as well as the most likely value of index itself. With the addition of
binary indicators and indicators that cannot be compared over countries, the state-space model quickly
becomes a very complex estimation problem. However, the Gibbs sampler estimator allows us to split
this complex problem up into multiple much easier to solve subroutines. Instead of estimating the joint
probability of all variables at the same time (e.g. p(a, b)), the Gibbs sampler works with conditional
probabilities (p(a|b) and p(b|a)). It iteratively draws bi from p(b|ai−1) after which ai is drawn from
p(a|bi). It can be shown that after thousands of draws, ai and bi will have converged to draws from the
original unconditional probability p(a, b). Those converged draws can then be used to reconstruct this
joint probability.
In this case, the Gibbs sampler has three main blocks, each consisting of several subroutines. Using
the entry subindex as example, we get the following conditional probabilities:
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A. Conditioning on the values of the index MPIE = [MPIE1,1, ...,MPI
E
1,n, ...,MPI
E
p,1, ...,MPI
E
p,n]
′, the
measurement equation (1) can be estimated equation by equation as a simple linear regressions.
p(zκ, cκ|MPI, yκ, Hκ) ∝ N (bκOLS , (X ′X)−1Hκ) (8)
p(Hκ|MPI, yκ) ∝ iWish (eκ′eκ; n) (9)
with X = [MPIE ,1], bκOLS = (X
′X)−1(X ′yκ) and eκ = yκ − cκ − zκ ∗MPIE .
When the migration policy indicator yκ cannot be compared over time, the intercept c is allowed to
differ for each country i. In that case, 1 is not a column vector 1np×1, but instead a vector of fixed
effects 1 = 1n×1⊗ Ip. In the case of binary indicators, the continuous latent equivalent yκ? should be
used instead of yκ. Moreover, in this case Hκ = 1 to ensure that the model is identified.
B. Conditional on the parameters of the state and measurement equations, the probability of the ‘true’
openness of migration policy can be computed and drawn from using the Carter and Kohn (1994)
simulation smoother. To this end, we stack the parameters of the measurement equation into vectors:
c = [c1, ..., ck]′ and z = [z1, ..., zk]′. As these steps are performed country-by-country, we temporarily
drop the subscript i to simplify notation.
• The Kalman filter
Starting from a wild guess, p(MPIE0 ) = N(0,∞), the following equations are iteratively solved
for t = 1 to t = n:
MPIEt|t = E(MPI
E
t |y1, ..., yt)
= mpiEt−1|t−1 + κ(yt − c− z mpit−1|t−1) (10)
pt|t = var(MPI
E
t |y1, ..., yt)
= pt|t−1 + κzpt−1|t−1 (11)
with κ = pt|t−1z′(zpt|t−1z′ +H)−1; and pt|t−1 = pt−1|t−1 + 1.
• Simulation smoother
The simulation smoother algorithm is used to draw values for MPIE . Starting from the last
iteration of the Kalman filter, draw ˆMPIEn from N(mpi
E
n|n; pn|n) and iterate backwards from
t = n− 1 to t = 1:
mpiEt|n = E(MPI
E
t |y1, ..., yn)
= mpiEt|t + ς( ˆmpiEt+1|n −mpiEt|t) (12)
pt|n = var(MPI
E
t |y1, ..., yn)
= pt|t + ς(pt+1|n − p′t|t − 1)ς ′ (13)
with ς = p′t|tp
−1
t+1|t; and
ˆmpiEt+1|n a random draw from N(mpi
E
t+1|n; pt+1|n).
C. The latent variable y?
Finally, we have to draw new values for the latent variable(s) yκ? conditional on cκ and zκ from step
A, and MPIE from step B. This is done by drawing from a truncated normal distribution to ensure
that yκ? > 0 when yκ = 1 and vice versa.
yκ?i,t |zκ, cκ,MPIEi,t, yκ =
{
N
(
cκ + zκMPIEi,t, 1
)
1yκ?>0 if y
κ = 1;
N
(
cκ + zκMPIEi,t, 1
)
1yκ?≤0 if yκ = 0.
(14)
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Priors
Because the state-space model is estimated in a Bayesian framework, it is necessary to specify the prior
distribution of the parameters. However, since there is no prior information available on the parameters
of the measurement equation, z, c and log(H), flat probabilities are used for these variables. This means
that all values in R are equally probable.
p(z) ∝ 1k×1; (15)
p(c) ∝ 1(k×1); (16)
p(log(H)) ∝ Ik×k. (17)
Convergence
The Gibbs sampler algorithm ran 100,000 iterations of which the first 50,000 were discarded as burn-in.
The draws of the parameters of state and measurement equation were individually examined using simple
plotted values, autocorrelation functions and a rolling window CUMSUMs. Figure 7 illustrates this for
the first element of z. All point to a well-behaved, converged distribution, which is what is found for the
other parameters as well.
Figure 7: Convergence statistics for z1
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Top left: simple plot of all drawn values; top right: the empirical distribution function; bottom left: the autocorrelation
function; and bottom right: the rolling window CUMSUM statistic, with 95% significance bounds (window: 1000 draws).
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